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Metacognitive monitoring refers to how people evaluate their cognitive performance. An 
extensive literature examines how accurately individuals engage in monitoring. The question 
of how often individuals engage in metacognitive monitoring has been largely neglected, 
although one might expect situational, group, and individual variability in monitoring frequency. 
We argue that this is a critical omission, given that the frequency of metacognitive monitoring 
might have important implications for monitoring accuracy and task performance. Within this 
review, we highlight findings from three literatures, that each provide insight into how often 
individuals engage in monitoring. To clarify the important links and potential overlaps between 
these separate bodies of research, we begin by summarizing the metacognitive monitoring 
literature, including age-related patterns in monitoring accuracy. We then connect these 
questions regarding spontaneous monitoring, including age-related patterns in spontaneous 
monitoring, to targeted reviews of the self-regulated learning, think-aloud protocol, and mind-
wandering literatures. We discuss situational and dispositional factors believed to influence 
monitoring accuracy, and propose that the same factors could potentially influence the frequency 
of spontaneous monitoring. Additionally, we propose that age-related increases in spontaneous 
monitoring (as suggested by age-related increases in TRI) may contribute to older adults’ intact 
monitoring abilities. It is our hope that this review will encourage increased attention and 
research on the topic of spontaneous monitoring. 
 






Imagine you are sitting down to read a lengthy and complicated scientific article. It is important 
that you understand and can later remember the information it contains. As you read through the 
dense article, you find yourself engaging in extraneous thoughts. You might realize you are 
getting distracted by noises in your environment and stop reading until you relocate to a quieter 
place. Or perhaps you periodically quiz yourself on what you had just read. If you find your 
comprehension lacking, you may re-read a critical section. These are just some examples 
of metacognition, or thoughts one has regarding their own cognitive processes (Flavell, 1979). 
 
Three distinct yet inter-related aspects of metacognition include knowledge, control, and 
monitoring. Metacognitive knowledge refers to a person’s understanding and beliefs about 
cognition. Metacognitive control refers to regulating one’s ongoing cognitive 
activities. Metacognitive monitoring refers to various thoughts people have regarding their 
ongoing task performance or progress. Metacognitive thoughts about one’s task knowledge, 
performance, and approach are expected to occur with varying frequency in everyday life, but 
the question of how frequently individuals engage in metacognitive thoughts has been largely 
neglected within the study of metacognition. 
 
In this review, we discuss the importance of studying the frequency of individuals’ 
metacognitive thoughts, with the goal of increasing attention and future research on the issue. 
The specific focus of this paper considers the frequency of metacognitive monitoring, or thoughts 
regarding task performance. An extensive literature has examined metacognitive monitoring, 
generally focusing on whether individuals’ judgments about their task performance accurately 
reflect how well they are actually performing, and which factors predict or influence the 
accuracy of one’s performance-related thoughts. The question of how frequently individuals 
spontaneously monitor their task performance is an also critical but comparatively neglected 
research question. It is possible that the degree to which one spontaneously reflects on their task 
performance influences the accuracy of those thoughts and, ultimately, performance on the 
associated cognitive task. 
 
The question of age-related patterns in spontaneous thoughts about task performance is also of 
particular interest. Older adults’ metacognitive monitoring abilities remain relatively spared 
despite declines in other types of cognitive functioning (Dunlosky & Connor, 1997; Hasher, 
Zacks, & May, 1999; Salthouse, 1991; Shaw & Craik, 1989) but no work within the 
metacognition literature has examined the specific frequency and content of monitoring 
experiences in older adults. We argue that age-related patterns in the frequency or content of 
spontaneous metacognitive thoughts may influence age-related patterns in monitoring accuracy 
and task performance. 
 
In discussing the importance of studying the frequency of individuals’ thoughts regarding task 
performance, we begin with a brief overview of metacognitive monitoring, including discussion 
of age-related patterns in monitoring and other influences on metacognitive monitoring accuracy. 
Following this review of the monitoring literature, we consider how findings from the self-
regulated learning, think-aloud protocol, and mind-wandering studies provide an indication of 
how frequently individuals think about their task performance. Finally, we present avenues for 
future research that focus on the frequency of spontaneous regarding task performance in both 
younger and older adults. 
 
The relationships between cognition and different types of metacognitive thoughts can be 
understood by examining popular models of metacognition, such as the Nelson and Naren model 
(1990; see Fig. 1) and the COPES model of self-regulated learning (Winne & Hadwin, 1998). 
These models include an interplay between one’s ability to use metacognitive monitoring to 
evaluate task performance and one’s ability to use the results of that monitoring to alter task 
approach and thus improve task performance. Although these models assume that people reflect 
on their task performance spontaneously, few studies address the question of how often 
individuals spontaneously engage in metacognitive thoughts, or how frequently people engage in 




Fig. 1. The Nelson and Narens (1990) framework demonstrating the relationship between 
metacognition (“meta-level”) and cognition (“object-level”), showing how metacognitive 
monitoring is used to check and update one’s model of an ongoing task 
 
Determining the accuracy of peoples’ insights regarding their memory processes involves 
comparing ones’ performance judgments to their actual task memory performance. Monitoring 
accuracy is a topic of great interest because accurate monitoring should lead to more updating of 
one’s task representations, more effective regulation of task activities and, ultimately, improved 
task performance. Monitoring and control processes are believed to operate in a feedback loop 
(“monitoring affects control hypothesis”; Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). If peoples’ thoughts 
regarding their task performance are accurate then effective strategies can be chosen to complete 
the task and improve performance. Individuals with better memory performance (Maki & 
Berry, 1984) and study strategies (Connor, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 1997) have been shown to 
have better monitoring accuracy. 
 
Examples of metacognitive judgments include judgments of learning (JOLs; Arbuckle & 
Cuddy, 1969), feeling of knowing judgments (FOKs; Hart, 1965), and confidence judgments 
(CJs). JOLs are made during encoding and tap into individuals’ thoughts about how well they 
have learned an item (Arbuckle & Cuddy, 1969). FOKs are made during retention or retrieval of 
information and are judgments regarding the likelihood of recognizing currently unrecallable 
answers on a later test (Hart, 1965; Nelson, Leonesio, Shimamura, Landwehr, & Narens, 1982). 
CJs are made after a participant has retrieved an answer and reflect participants’ thoughts about 
how well they were able to recall information. 
 
Factors that influence monitoring accuracy 
 
In the following sections, we briefly discuss task-related predictors and individual-level 
characteristics that may influence how well people evaluate their task performance. While these 
factors have been shown to influence monitoring accuracy, they may also influence the degree to 
which individuals spontaneously think about their task performance. 
 
Situational predictors of monitoring accuracy 
 
Individuals consider different and multiple cues when they think about their task performance 
and make metacognitive judgments (Hertzog, Hines, & Touron, 2013; Kelemen, Frost, & 
Weaver, 2000). Cues refer to information that individuals consider when thinking about task 
performance (Brunswick, 1943; Koriat, 1997; Nelson, 1996), such as processing fluency or item 
difficulty (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009). Cue utilization refers to whether individuals use cues 
when making their metacognitive judgments. Cues are considered diagnostic if they predict 
criterion performance and non-diagnostic of they do not predict criterion performance. 
Participants often do not properly use diagnostic cues to make accurate metacognitive 
judgments, and instead use non-diagnostic cues (Hertzog et al., 2002). 
 
Older adults and younger adults seem to be influenced by similar types of cues and there is little 
change in JOL resolution with increased age (Dunlosky & Hertzog, 2000; Hertzog, Kidder, 
Powell-Moman, & Dunlosky, 2002; Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010; Robinson et 
al., 2006). However, the number of cues used at a given time depends in part on one’s available 
cognitive resources (Griffin, Wiley, & Thiede, 2008). Given that executive control abilities 
decrease with age, older adults are less likely to use multiple cues when making metacognitive 
judgments (Ferguson, Hashtroudi, & Johnson, 1992). Cues used to make metacognitive 
judgments may also influence one’s overall propensity to engage in monitoring; this possibility 
is discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
 
Individual-level influences of monitoring accuracy 
 
Characteristics of the individual making the judgments also influence monitoring accuracy. 
Metacognitive processes (including monitoring) can increase cognitive load (Coutinho, Redford, 
Church, Zakrzewski, Couchman, & Smith, 2015; Stine-Morrow, Shake, Miles, & Noh, 2006), so 
it is unsurprising that executive control ability has been found to influence one’s ability to think 
about task performance. At least in younger adults, studies have found a positive association 
between working memory capacity and monitoring accuracy (Kelemen, Frost, & Weaver, 2000; 
Komori; 2016). 
 
Normal cognitive aging is characterized by declines in a wide variety of cognitive tasks. 
Cognitive aging is associated with poorer performance on memory tasks (Lovelace & 
Marsh, 1985; Rabinowitz, Ackerman, Craik, & Hinchley, 1982; Shaw & Craik, 1989), declines 
in processing speed (Salthouse, 1991), executive control (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999; 
McDowd & Craik, 1988), and rate of learning (Dunlosky & Connor, 1997). Given these age-
related cognitive declines, one might expect that older adults would also suffer relative to 
younger adults in monitoring ability. However, most evidence suggests age invariance in 
monitoring accuracy. 
 
Younger adults have above-chance relative JOL accuracy (Hertzog, Kidder, Powell, Moman, & 
Dunlosky, 2002; Leonesio & Nelson, 1990; Robinson, Hertzog, & Dunlosky, 2006), and older 
adults have similar or higher relative JOL accuracy, at least when older adults are asked to 
provide item-by-item (Baker, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 2010; Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & 
Sanvito, 1989; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Hertzog, Kiddler, Powell-
Momon, & Dunlosky, 2002; Hertzog, Sinclair, & Dunlosky, 2010) rather than global predictions 
of performance (Brigham & Pressley, 1988; Hertzog, Price, & Dunlosky, 2008; Hertzog, Touron, 
& Hines, 2007). Absolute JOL accuracy may also be equivalent in younger and older adults 
(McDonald-Miszczak, Hunter, & Hultsch, 1994). 
 
As with JOLs, younger adults’ FOKs are moderately correlated with task performance 
(Hart, 1967; Nelson, Leonesio, Shimamura, Landwehr, & Narens, 1982) and absolute accuracy 
for FOK judgments about general knowledge also shows age invariance (Butterflied, Nelson, & 
Peck, 1988; Eakin, Hertzog, & Harris, 2014; Souchay, Moulin, Clarys, Taconnat, & 
Isingrini, 2007). Findings on age-related differences in the accuracy of CJs have been mixed; 
some work suggests that younger and older adults are equally good at making post-dictions 
regarding memory performance (Hertzog, Saylor, Fleece, & Dixon, 1994), whereas other studies 
suggest that older adults are more likely than younger adults to produce high-confidence false 
alarms (e.g., Dodson, Bawa, & Krueger, 2007) and show poorer resolution in CJs when incorrect 
lures are present (e.g., Kelley & Sahakyan, 2003), indicating that older adults may poorly encode 
information (Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011). 
 
Although there is evidence that monitoring accuracy is largely spared with age, participants’ 
expectations and beliefs regarding their memory ability (Crumley, Stetler, & Horhota, 2014) can 
influence monitoring accuracy. For example, as people age the association between their 
subjective and objective memory performance increases (Crumley, Stetler, & Horhota, 2014). 
Subjective memory is typically measured by having participants self-rate their general memory 
ability, which is then compared to objective performance on a memory test. As participants age 
they tend to do worse on objective memory tasks but they also report worse subjective memory 
performance (Cook & Marsiske, 2006; Crumley, Stetler, & Horhota, 2014; Hülür, Hertzog, 
Pearman, & Gerstorf, 2015; Wahlin, Maitland, Backman, & Dixon, 2003; Zelinski, Gilewski, & 
Thompson, 1980). Older adults may become increasingly aware of their memory deficits as they 
age. 
 
Memory self-efficacy also influences the thoughts individuals have regarding their task 
performance. Older adults tend to report lower memory self-efficacy than younger adults 
(Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989; Hertzog et al., 1990; Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1987). Older adults 
with higher memory self-efficacy not only have better memory performance, but they also report 
higher predictions of their memory ability (Hertzog et al., 1990). Therefore, one’s global 
memory self-efficacy appears to influence one’s subjective memory and monitoring ability. 
 
Differences in personality are also associated with monitoring accuracy. Participants who score 
highly on the characteristics of openness to new experiences and extraversion tend to have higher 
confidence in their JOLs than those who score lower on these characteristics (Buratti, Allwood, 
& Kleitman, 2013). Relationships between extraversion and overconfidence (Dahl, Allwood, 
Rennemark, & Hagberg, 2010; Pallier, Wilkinson, Danthir, Kleitman, Knezevic, Stankov, & 
Roberts, 2002; Schaefer, Williams, Goodie, & Campbell, 2004) and openness and 
overconfidence (Dahl et al., 2010; Schaefer, Williams, Goodie, & Campbell, 2004) have also 
been observed. Older adults high in agreeableness and consciousness have stronger associations 
between their subjective memory ratings and objective memory performance, suggesting that 
older adults high in these personality factors monitor more accurately than those who are low in 
these factors (Hülür, Hertzog, Pearman, & Gerstorf, 2015). 
 
Factors that influence how accurately people monitor, such as cognitive resources and 
personality characteristics, may also contribute to individual differences in the frequency of 
metacognitive thoughts one experiences while completing a cognitive task. This possibility is 
discussed in more detail later in the paper. 
 
Assessing monitoring frequency 
 
As mentioned, studying the accuracy of metacognitive thoughts requires participants to make 
explicit judgments (i.e., JOLs, FOKs, and CJs) about their cognitive abilities. Research 
examining the accuracy of these metacognitive judgements provide us with information 
regarding how accurately people monitor, but they tell us less about how often they monitor. 
Although studies focusing on the accuracy of metacognitive judgments may not be useful in 
answering questions regarding monitoring frequency, other methodologies can be used to 
determine often people monitor, age-related changes in monitoring frequency, and situations and 
characteristics that alter propensity to engage in monitoring. First, we will discuss studies from 
the metacognition literature examining self-regulated learning and spontaneous strategy use, 
given that individual-differences in spontaneous use of certain learning strategies may reflect 
differences in spontaneous metacognitive monitoring. Secondly, we will discuss metacognition 
studies conducted using think-aloud protocols. Finally, we will discuss studies from the mind-
wandering literature that focus on frequency of off-task thoughts about metacognition. 
 
Findings from self-regulated learning 
 
As described above, a substantial literature suggests that monitoring ability is robust and remains 
fairly intact with age. However, there is little work addressing how frequently individuals 
spontaneously think about their task performance. One area of research that can address the 
question of monitoring frequency focuses on self-regulated learning. In these studies, 
participants are asked to study information for a later test, and participants’ allocation of study 
time across items can be examined for the extent to which learning and later test performance are 
optimized. As described in the Nelson and Narens (1990) model presented in Fig. 1, 
metacognition involves both monitoring and control processes, where cognitive activity (such as 
learning) is represented at the meta-level via monitoring processes, and this representation may 
inform or produce actions (such as the regulation of study time) via control processes. 
Spontaneous self-regulation of study is a classic case of the interplay between these two 
components of metacognition. 
 
Research in this area often focuses on individual differences in self-regulated learning and 
strategy use. For example, some individuals more efficiently allocate their study time. 
Academically successful fifth-grade students show sensitivity to the difficulty of to-be-studied 
texts (Owings, Petersen, Bransford, Morris, & Stein, 1980), spontaneously allocating more study 
time towards texts rated as difficult compared to texts rated as easy. In contrast, less successful 
students studied equally for both difficulty and easy texts, whereas these students could 
distinguish text difficulty and adjust their allocation of study time when prompted, they did 
not spontaneously do so. The ability to spontaneously allocate one’s study time improves across 
childhood, with younger children (grades 1 and 3) spontaneously engaging in less efficient use of 
study time than older children (grades 5 and 7) (Dufresne & Kobasigawa, 1989). Self-paced 
study in college students shows similar findings. More successful college students study harder 
items longer than easy items, whereas less successful college students do not spontaneously 
allocate more study time towards studying difficult items (Cull & Zechmeister, 1994). 
 
Differences between younger and older adults in self-regulated learning have also been 
examined, with mixed findings (see Bottiroli, Dunlosky, Guerini, Cavallini, & Hertzog, 2010). In 
one study, older and younger adults were asked to think aloud when studying sets of pictures 
matched in difficulty for a later serial recall test. Younger adults spontaneously studied longer, 
rehearsed the information more, and had better eventual recall than older adults for difficult 
items (Murphy, Sanders, Gabriesheski, & Schmitt, 1981). Older adults did not study the difficult 
items or rehearse the items unless specifically instructed to do so. In this aging study and in the 
previously mentioned studies of children and college students, spontaneous allocation of study 
time towards difficult items is believed to reflect more spontaneous monitoring, given that both 
children and younger adults can allocate study time to more difficult items but do not readily do 
so unless specifically prompted to. Older adults have also been found not to study difficult items 
for as long as younger adults do, unless they are specifically given instructions that encourage 
increased monitoring (Murphy, Schmitt, Caruso, & Sanders, 1987). 
 
These findings suggest that some people spontaneously engage in monitoring of task features 
such as stimuli difficulty. Individuals who more effectively monitor and self-regulate their 
learning strategies achieve better task performance than those who presumably do not as readily 
engage in monitoring. While the self-regulated learning work suggests variability within and 
between age groups in spontaneous monitoring and control as well as age-related declines in 
these processes, it is important to note that study time allocation most directly reflects 
metacognitive control rather than monitoring. The specific frequency of spontaneous monitoring 
and the content of monitoring processes can be inferred given the relationships between 
monitoring and control, but are not measured in these studies. More detailed information 
regarding individual differences in monitoring frequency and the frequency of different types of 
monitoring can be found by examining the think-aloud literature. 
 
Findings from think-aloud protocols 
 
Studies using think-aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Veenman, Elshout, & 
Groen, 1993) can provide insight into how often individuals engage in spontaneous monitoring. 
Using think-aloud protocols, the specific content and frequency of individuals’ metacognitive 
monitoring can be reported and measured. Within this section, we provide a brief overview of 
the think-aloud protocol approach along with a discussion of concerns regarding their 
veridicality and reactivity. Next, we briefly discuss the strengths and limitations associated with 
using think-aloud protocols in examining metacognition. Finally, we discuss findings from the 
think-aloud literature that provide insight into how often children, younger adults, and older 




Think-aloud protocols (Ericsson & Simon, 1984) have been widely used to investigate and build 
models of cognitive and metacognitive processes. In this research, participants (also known as 
“raters”) are instructed to verbalize their thoughts while completing a cognitive task. Think-
aloud protocols have been used to study reading comprehension, writing, mathematical problem-
solving, and other types of problem-solving. Rater’s verbalizations of their thought processes are 
recorded, transcribed, and then analyzed to identify the metacognitive and decision-making 
processes that are used when completing these tasks. Due to the rich nature of these data, 
metacognitive thoughts can be distinguished in fine detail, including whether they involve 
monitoring or control processes. 
 
Think-aloud protocols can garner large amounts of information regarding specific behaviors and 
thought processes, but there are criticisms and limitations to this approach. Because raters are 
typically not accustomed to verbalizing their internal thought processes while simultaneously 
focusing on completing a task (Smagorinsky, 1994), think-aloud protocols can be difficult to 
administer. Participants must receive instructions regarding how to verbalize their thoughts and 
often need to be prompted to continue verbalizing during the task. Additionally, gathering and 
scoring data from individual raters’ think-aloud protocols is time-consuming and experimenters 
must be trained on how to properly score think-aloud protocols. Therefore, using think-aloud 
protocols can be challenging with large participant samples (Azevedo et al. 2010; Schellings & 
Broekkamp, 2011). 
 
Other perhaps more fundamental criticisms of think-aloud protocols involve their veridicality 
and reactivity. Veridicality concerns whether think-aloud protocols accurately represent raters’ 
actual and complete thinking. Reactivity concerns whether think-aloud protocols alter either the 
processes being observed or the outcomes of those processes (i.e., task performance). Ericsson 
and Simon (1984) note that veridicality depends on the nature of the task being completed. 
Think-aloud protocols are believed to be most accurate for the contents of raters’ short-term 
memory, which should be accessible for conscious introspection as long as rater verbalizations 
are concurrent to the task of interest (Ericsson & Simon, 1987; Lumley, 2005). 
 
Regarding the reactivity of think-aloud protocols, Ericsson and Simon (1984, 1993) argue that 
this depends on the type of verbalization requested. It is advised that raters merely verbalize their 
thought processes and behaviors without interpreting them (Ericsson & Simon, 1984, 1993). A 
meta-analysis (Russo, Johnson, & Stephens, 1989) indicated that think-aloud protocols result in 
significantly longer response times (Fidler, 1983; Karpf, 1973) and fewer problems being solved 
within a fixed time period (Fryer, 1941). However, think-aloud protocols are not associated with 
changes in task accuracy (Leow & Morgan-Short, 2004; Barkaoui, 2011) and are thus not 
believed to alter the underlying thought processes and behaviors associated with the task. 
 
Think-aloud protocols and monitoring frequency 
 
Think-aloud studies sometimes include the exact frequencies of verbalized metacognitive 
thoughts, which provides an indication of how frequently people spontaneously think about task 
performance. As with the self-regulated learning literature, findings from the think-aloud 
protocol literature suggest that some individuals more spontaneously engage in metacognitive 
monitoring than others and that those who do chose more effective strategies and end up 
obtaining better task performance. Think-aloud protocols have been used to examine differences 
in metacognition between high-achieving and low-achieving students and between expert and 
non-expert problem solvers. 
 
For example, think-aloud protocols collected during a reading comprehension task reveal that 
fourth and fifth grade students vary considerably in how frequently they reported monitoring 
(Meyers, Lytle, Palladino, & Green, 1990). Across all students, verbalizations that reflected 
metacognitive monitoring made up 8.5% of the total number of verbalizations, with a range of 
between 0% and 27% of students’ verbalizations during the task. While the number of 
monitoring verbalizations as a percentage of total verbalizations was not broken down by reading 
comprehension scores in this study, Meyers et al. (1990) did note that the more successful 
readers verbalized monitoring more frequently than unsuccessful readers. The finding that 
children who are successful readers verbalize more monitoring has been corroborated by other 
studies (Garner & Taylor, 1982; Janssen et al., 2006; Yuill & Oakhill, 1991). 
 
Studies of monitoring frequency using think-aloud protocols for reading tasks with older children 
and young adults have found comparable results. “Adequate readers” aged 12–18 years report 
more monitoring for both informational and narrative texts compared to “poor readers” of the 
same age (Denton, Enos, York, Francis, Barnes, Kulesz, Fletcher, & Carter, 2015). Among high-
school students, more academically successful students report more monitoring during reading 
tasks than less academically successful students (Janssen et al., 2006). These findings all suggest 
that some children and young adults engage in more spontaneous monitoring than others, and 
these increases in spontaneous monitoring may influence task approach and task performance. 
 
The type of reading material being studied has also been found to alter monitoring frequency. In 
studies using think-aloud protocols during reading tasks, college students who read narrative 
texts were found to make fewer metacognitive comments than students who read informative 
texts (Trabasso & Magliano, 1996) and college students who read narrative texts recreationally 
reported less monitoring than students who read informative texts (Narvaez et al., 1999). 
 
Think-aloud protocols have also been used to examine differences in monitoring during 
mathematical problem-solving. Gifted students verbalize monitoring more often than both 
average-achieving and learning-disabled children (Montague & Applegate, 1993). Additionally, 
students verbalize monitoring more when they are completing open-ended math problems and 
complex math problems compared to easier problems (Mokos & Kafoussi, 2013). Various think-
aloud protocol studies of other types of problem-solving have found that expert problem-solvers 
more spontaneously use self-monitoring to improve task performance (for a review, see 
Glaser, 1991). As with reading comprehension tasks, there is individual variability in 
spontaneous monitoring, with those who report more spontaneous monitoring also obtaining 
better task performance. 
 
Schellings et al. (2013) used think-aloud protocols to assess the frequency of different types of 
metacognitive activities. In this study, protocols for 20 high school students were recorded as 
they read a history text for an upcoming exam. On average, 30.6% of the reported activities were 
examples of metacognitive monitoring (Schellings, Hout-Wolters, Veenman, & Meijer, 2013), 
with participants varying considerably in how much monitoring they reported. Other work that 
has used think-aloud protocols to examine the frequency of various metacognitive thoughts 
during learning of a foreign language (Leow & Morgan-Short) and reading comprehension tasks 
(Martin, 1987) has found similar frequencies of metacognitive monitoring. 
 
Instructions to engage in self-testing have been found to increase monitoring. Fernandez and 
Jamet (2017) found that college students spontaneously report monitoring task performance on 
roughly 28% of their verbalizations and spontaneously report monitoring the effectiveness of 
their task strategies on roughly 5% of their verbalizations. When given instructed to engage in 
self-testing, verbalizations about performance monitoring increased to roughly 49% and 
verbalizations about strategy monitoring increased to roughly 14%. Additionally, performance 
was improved when raters were asked to engage in self-testing. Spontaneous monitoring 
frequency is also associated with strategy use in regular and in computer-learning environments 
(Deekens, Greene, & Lobczowski, 2018). 
 
Think-aloud protocols, monitoring frequency, and age 
 
In addition to being used in studied with children and younger adults, think-aloud protocols have 
been used to study metacognition in older adults and to examine age-related changes in 
metacognition. One study comparing think-aloud protocols obtained during the Tower of London 
Task found that the number of verbalizations about monitoring did not differ between younger 
and older adults (Gilhooly, Phillips, Wynn, Logie, & Della Sala, 1999). This finding suggests 
age-invariance in monitoring frequency. While few think-aloud protocol and aging studies have 
directly examined frequency of metacognitive verbalizations, some additional think-aloud 
protocol research has found that younger and older adults report equivalent generation of 
mediators when studying lists of words, which could indicate that younger and older adults both 
engaged in spontaneous monitoring during the task (Fox, Baldock, Freeman, & Berry, 2016). 
 
While studies such as these provide an idea of how often spontaneous monitoring occurs, and 
suggest that there are individual differences in propensity to spontaneously monitor, many think-
aloud studies do not report the specific frequencies of verbalizations corresponding to 
monitoring. As such, this literature does not currently provide a clear indication of exactly how 
often frequently monitoring occurs, how much individuals vary in their frequency of monitoring, 
or how monitoring frequency changes across the lifespan. 
 
Findings from mind-wandering research 
 
The mind-wandering literature may provide additional insight into how often individuals 
spontaneous engage in metacognitive thoughts. It is common for one’s attention to become 
decoupled from the task they are completing and instead become directed towards internally 
generated thoughts, an experience commonly referred to as mind-wandering (Giambra, 1995, 
Smallwood & Schooler, 2006). As with concurrent think-aloud protocols, studies of mind-
wandering often require participants to report the types of thoughts they experience as they 
perform a cognitive task. While the think-aloud protocol literature focuses on the types of on-
task and metacognitive thoughts individuals experience during completion of cognitive tasks, the 
mind-wandering literature focuses on the frequency of both task-relevant and task-irrelevant 
thinking that occurs during task completion. 
 
An early theory of mind-wandering, current-concerns theory (Klinger, 1971), originated to 
explain the flow of conscious, internally-generated thoughts. This theory postulates that, once a 
person establishes a particular goal, this goal becomes a current concern. Current concerns are 
kept accessible until they are either abandoned or resolved, and can therefore be cued by stimuli 
in one’s environment as well as by their other thoughts (Klinger, 1971). This can result in 
individuals experiencing different types of off-task thoughts, depending on the current concerns 
experienced within a given environment. 
 
Individuals have a wide variety of thoughts throughout the course of a day, which can be 
conceptualized along two dimensions: “task-relatedness” and “stimulus-dependency” 
(Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011a). Experiencing thoughts 
that are task-related and stimulus-dependent indicate that one is completely focused on 
performing the task. Intrusive thoughts that are stimulus-dependent but task-unrelated include 
external sources of distraction (Forster & Lavie, 2008; Unsworth, Redick, Lakey, & 
Young, 2010). Intrusive thoughts that are stimulus-independent and task-related include 
interfering thoughts that are related to task appraisal and include metacognitive thoughts 
(Matthews, Joyner, Gililand, Campbell, & Falconner, 1999; Smallwood, Davies, Heim, 
Finnigan, Sudberry, O’Connor, & Obonsawin, 2004). Finally, thoughts that are both stimulus-
independent and task-unrelated include mind-wandering about things that are completely 
unrelated to the task and environment (Antrobus, Singer, Goldstein, & Fortgang, 1970; 
Giambra, 1989; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006; Teasdale, Dritschel, Taylor, Prcotor, Llyod, 
Nimmo-Smith, & Baddeley, 1995). 
 
The frequency of these categories of thoughts can be assessed in several ways. Mind-wandering 
can be studied using retrospective questionnaires (Lachman & Agrigoroaei, 2012; Maillet & 
Rajah, 2013). However, as with retrospective think-aloud assessments, using retrospective 
thought content questionnaires carries the risk of participants either forgetting or incorrectly 
reconstructing the thoughts experienced during the task of interest. This is particularly 
problematic for older adults who experience both memory declines and difficulty in aggregating 
information regarding their cognitive performance (Hertzog et al., 2008; Hertzog, Touron, & 
Hines, 2007). 
 
Mind-wandering can instead be studied by having participants engage in a cognitive task during 
which their intrusive thoughts are either “self-caught” or “probe-caught.” With the “self-caught” 
method, participants must monitor their thoughts during the task and indicate when they notice 
their mind is wandering from the task. In studies using the “probe-caught” method, participants 
instead respond to thought probes that periodically interrupt the task. These probes ask 
participants to indicate the type of thought that they were experiencing right before the probe 
appeared. Because the self-caught method requires participants to monitor their internally-
generated thought processes and is thus more cognitively demanding, the probe-caught method is 
more commonly used, especially in studies of aging and mind-wandering. 
 
Probes vary in the questions they include, but often ask participants to classify the type of 
thought they experienced immediately prior to the appearance of the probe. Thought probes are 
typically positioned approximately 2 to 3 min apart to allow the mind to begin wandering across 
task trials (see Seli, Carriere, Levene, & Smilek, 2013). An example of a commonly-used 
thought probe appears below. As participants complete computerized cognitive tasks, they are 
occasionally interrupted and asked “What were you just thinking about?” Participants select one 
of the following options using their computer keyboard: 
 
(1) The task: Focused on completing the task, verifying equations and remembering letters 
(2) Task experience/performance: Evaluating one’s performance 
(3) Everyday things: Thinking about recent or impending life events 
(4) Current state of being: Thinking about conditions such as hunger or sleepiness 
(5) Personal worries: Thinking about concerns, troubles or fear not relating to the 
experimental task  
(6) Daydreams: Fantasies disconnected from reality 
(7) Other 
  
The response options correspond to different types of thoughts the participants may have been 
experiencing. Here, option (1) corresponds to being completely on-task and thinking only about 
responding to the task stimuli, option (2) corresponds to thoughts regarding task performance, 
and options (3) through (7) correspond to thoughts that are completely unrelated to the cognitive 
task at hand. Several online thought probes are embedded throughout an experimental task, and 
participants’ responses are used to obtain mean proportions of on-task thoughts, thoughts about 
things unrelated to the task, and thoughts about task performance or strategy. 
 
Mind-wandering reports obtained using probes such as the one above seem to provide an 
accurate reflection of participants’ underlying thought processes. Participants’ probe-caught 
mind-wandering is associated with higher in-the-moment task errors relative to on-task reports 
(McVay & Kane, 2012; McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013) and is also correlated with 
measures of attentional lapses such as intraindividual response time variability (McVay & 
Kane, 2009; McVay & Kane, 2012; McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013). Importantly, probe-
caught thought reports do not simply reflect participants’ reactive explanations for their own 
performance. In other words, participants do not seem to assume that mind-wandering has 
occurred whenever they make performance errors. Research comparing different types of errors 
find that mind-wandering is associated only with target misses but not lure false alarms, 
supporting the notion that participants’ probe-caught thought reports are a valid measure of their 
underlying thought processes (McVay, Meier, Touron, & Kane, 2013). Additionally, in a study 
examining the effects of mind-wandering on younger and older adults’ eye-movements and 
reading comprehension (Frank, Nara, Zavagnin, Touron, & Kane, 2015) individuals in both age 
groups made more regressions and engaged in more blinking when reporting mind-wandering 
than when they reported being on-task (Frank et al., 2015), further validating that mind-




Particularly relevant to the question of how often individuals spontaneously monitor their task 
performance is the smaller body of literature examining intrusive thoughts that are both stimulus-
independent and task-related. Such thoughts are referred to as “task-related interference” (TRI). 
Because TRI encompasses thoughts regarding task performance and task appraisal, TRI appears 
to be analogous to metacognitive monitoring. As such, and critical to the current review, studies 
examining the frequency and content of TRI can provide insight into how and how frequently 
individuals monitor their task performance. 
 
Even though TRI encompasses metacognitive thoughts, within the mind-wandering literature 
TRI is often characterized as a type of mind-wandering. Both TUTs and TRI have been linked to 
in-the-moment performance deficits (McVay & Kane, 2009; McVay et al., 2013; Mrazek, Chin, 
Schamder, Hartson, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011; Smallwood, O’Connor, & Heim, 2005), 
indicating that, while TRI experiences are stimulus-dependent, they are distinguishable from on-
task thoughts where participants are entirely focused on responding appropriately to task 
demands. 
 
Factors that influence TRI 
 
Early research focusing on thoughts about task appraisal was conducted in the testing anxiety 
and cognitive interference body of literature (Peterson, Swing, Braverman, & Buss, 1982; 
Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986). This early research examining off-task 
thoughts about task appraisal suggests that some individuals are more likely than others to 
experience task-related interference (Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986). Various 
factors influence the amount of TRI (metacognitive monitoring) experienced while completing a 
cognitive task (Frank et al., 2015; Jordano & Touron, 2017a; Jordano & Touron, 2017b; McVay 
et al., 2013; Smallwood et al., 2009). 
 
For example, increased negative affect is associated with increased reporting of both TUTs 
(Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood et al., 2009) and TRI (Smallwood et al., 2009). Task 
difficulty is also associated with propensity to engage in mind-wandering. McVay et al. (2013) 
found that frequency or TUTs and TRI were differentially affected by task difficulty. Younger 
adults reported fewer TUTs during a more challenging task than during an easier task, perhaps 
because they had fewer spare cognitive resources available to engage in TUTs. In contrast, both 
younger and older adults report more TRI during challenging tasks compared easier tasks, 
indicating that participants have more evaluative thoughts about their performance and engage in 
more monitoring when the task is difficult. Similarly, Zavagnin et al. (2014) found that that older 
adults report more TRI during difficult tasks compared to easier tasks. The results of these 
studies suggest that manipulating task difficulty can increase one’s propensity to engage in 
metacognitive monitoring. 
 
Age influences both the amount of probe-caught mind-wandering and the content of those mind-
wandering experiences. While they report fewer TUTs and less overall mind-wandering 
compared to younger adults, older adults do report more TRI than younger adults (Frank et 
al., 2015; Jordano & Touron, 2017a; McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin, Borella, & De Beni, 2014). 
This may be surprising given age-related declines in executive control (Hasher, Zacks, & 
May, 1999). A framework of mind-wandering by McVay and Kane (2010) can accommodate 
these age-related patterns in mind-wandering. The “Control failures × Current concerns” account 
posits that intrusive thoughts are automatically and continuously generated in response to various 
environmental cues that prime an individual’s current goals and concerns (see Klinger 1978; 
Klinger & Cox, 1987-1988) and that off-task thoughts only enter conscious awareness through a 
failure of executive control resources to suppress those thoughts. Therefore, individual 
differences in mind-wandering are believed to involve an interaction between one’s executive 
control capabilities, motivation to prevent off-task thoughts from entering consciousness, and the 
extent to which environmental context primes current concerns (McVay & Kane, 2010). From 
this perspective, older adults have fewer TUTs and more TRI compared to younger adults in part 
because their current concerns differ from those of young adults. A typical laboratory testing 
environment on campus may trigger young adults’ current concerns regarding their everyday 
school-related concerns, leading to increased TUTs. This same testing environment may not cue 
older adults’ typical, everyday current concerns (Carstensen, 1995), instead triggering concerns 
about age-related cognitive decline (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000), leading to increased TRI. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Mean proportions of probe-caught thought types during the OSPAN (Jordano & 
Touron, 2017). Bars indicate SEs. TRI is broken down into proactive TRI (thinking about task 
strategy or approach) represented by the lighter portions of the TRI columns and reactive TRI 
(thinking about task performance) represented by the darker portion of the TRI columns. SE bars 
on the TRI columns represent the SE for overall mean proportion of TR. TRI task-related 
interference, TUT , YA younger adults, OA older adults, TR 
 
Some studies have manipulated the salience of current concerns and shown an impact on the type 
and amount of mind-wandering that people experience. Priming people to think about their 
unfulfilled, everyday goals leads to increased reporting of TUT experiences (Kopp, D’Mello, & 
Mills, 2015; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011; McVay & Kane, 2013). Likewise, the priming of 
personal, performance-related concerns increases the amount of TRI younger (Jordano & 
Touron, 2017b) and older adults (Jordano & Touron, 2017a; see Fig. 2) report. The salience of 
performance-related concerns can be manipulated by inducing stereotype threat (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995). Models of stereotype threat assume that reductions in task performance occur 
because secondary processes such as emotion regulation and metacognitive monitoring deplete 
individuals’ executive control resources (Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008). Given that 
stereotype threat manipulations increase the amount of TRI, factors believed to moderate 
stereotype threat may also affect the frequency of spontaneous monitoring. 
 
Concerns about one’s cognitive abilities can influence beliefs regarding the control one has over 
cognitive performance and cognitive change. Those with higher control beliefs believe that they 
can engage in behaviors that will allow them to maintain or even improve their cognitive 
functioning while getting older. Older adults with higher control beliefs have better memory 
performance (Lachman, Neupert, & Agrigoroaei, 2011) than those with lower control beliefs. 
Relationships also exist between control beliefs and mind-wandering; lower levels of perceived 
control negatively influence episodic memory performance by increasing retrospectively-caught 
TRI in both younger and older adults (Lachman & Agrigoroaei, 2012). Lower levels of perceived 
control may particularly increase negatively-valenced TRI. 
 
Mindfulness, or the ability to attend to the present moment in a non-judgmental way, is believed 
to affect attention. Although mind-wandering and mindfulness appear to be opposing constructs, 
the relationship between mindfulness and mind-wandering remains tentative. A negative 
association between trait mindfulness and probe-caught TUTs during sustained attention tasks 
(Fountain-Zaragoza, Londerée, Whitmoyer, & Prakash, 2016) has been observed. Frank et al. 
(2015) found that only one specific aspect of dispositional mindfulness (i.e., the tendency to 
observe and notice one’s surroundings) mediated the relationship between TRI and age. It is 
possible that those that score higher on measures of dispositional or trait mindfulness not only 
experience fewer TUTs, but also engage in more spontaneous monitoring. More work can be 
done examining how state and trait mindfulness affect propensity to engage in both TUTs and 
TRI. 
 
TRI and task performance 
 
Although both TUTs and TRI are associated with in-the-moment performance errors, it seems 
plausible that engaging in TRI could benefit task performance. Task-related interference may be 
analogous to metacognitive monitoring, and successfully monitoring can lead to improved 
metacognitive control and task performance. While some studies have found a negative 
association between TRI and task performance (Coy, O’Brien, Tabaczynski, Northern, & 
Carels, 2011; Jordano & Touron, 2017a; Jordano & Touron, 2017b; Smallwood et al., 2004; 
Smallwood et al., 2009), others have found a positive association (McVay & Kane, 2012) or no 
association (Stawarczyk, Majerus, Maj, van der Linden, & D’Argembeau, 2011b). The 
relationship between TRI and performance is normally examined as the effect of TRI on in-the-
moment performance or for shorter tasks. While TRI may disrupt performance in the moment, it 
is possible that TRI leads to downstream benefits that are only observable when longer or more 
complex tasks are used. Further research is needed to examine potential downstream benefits of 
TRI. 
 
While the studies reviewed here include TRI as a response option, it is important to note that the 
exact content of individuals’ TRI experiences remains largely uninvestigated. While TRI is 
believed to include thoughts about task performance (metacognitive monitoring), it is also 
possible that individuals think about implementing different task strategies to improve 
performance (metacognitive control). More research should be conducted examining the specific 
content of individuals’ TRI experiences, the frequency in which individuals spontaneously 
engage in different examples of TRI, as well as how different types of TRI affect task 
performance. 
 
Directions for future research 
 
Frequency of spontaneous monitoring in laboratory tasks 
 
Substantial progress in the understanding of spontaneous monitoring may be achieved with 
continued research using the approaches described in this review. Given that mind-wandering 
methods can offer detailed insight and are also relatively efficient, there may be particular 
motivation to pursue this approach. It is important to note that many mind-wandering studies do 
not include TRI as a response option and those that do typically assume that participants’ TRI 
episodes reflect off-task thoughts regarding task appraisal. Participants are not usually asked 
follow-up questions regarding the specific content of their TRI experiences. Because of this, it is 
difficult to determine whether TRI is equivalent to metacognitive monitoring, or whether TRI 
also encompasses other metacognitive thoughts, such as off-task thoughts regarding 
metacognitive control processes. In one study that provided multiple TRI subtypes to choose 
from (Jordano & Touron, 2017a), younger and older adults reported thinking about both task 
appraisal (metacognitive monitoring) and task strategy (metacognitive control). More work is 
needed to examine the exact content of individuals’ TRI experiences and to determine whether 
TRI can be thought of as equivalent to metacognitive monitoring. 
 
Theories of age-related cognitive change offer contrasting predictions regarding whether older 
adults are expected to engage in more or less spontaneous thinking than younger adults. From a 
neuroscience perspective, spontaneous thoughts seem to involve increased activation in the 
default-mode network of the brain (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008), and research 
suggests less connectivity in these areas for older adults (Damoiseaux, Beckmann, Arigita, 
Barkhof, Scheltens, Stam, Smith, & Rombouts, 2008). Although mind-wandering studies find 
that older adults report more off-task thoughts regarding task appraisal (Frank et al., 2015; 
Jordano & Touron, 2017a; McVay & Kane, 2012; McVay et al., 2013), research on other types 
of spontaneous cognitive thoughts support the reduced cognitive resources theory of aging and 
reduced spontaneous cognition in older adults (Craik, 1983; Craik & Byrd, 1982). It is therefore 
unclear whether we should expect declines in spontaneous monitoring with age. 
 
A next step in the study of spontaneous metacognitive monitoring should be to measure the 
frequency of both younger and older adults’ performance-related thoughts in laboratory settings 
across various cognitive tasks. Online thought content probes from the mind-wandering literature 
can provide a methodology for allowing participants to indicate the content of their thoughts 
while completing cognitive tasks in the lab. Such studies can provide an indication of the degree 
to which individuals spontaneously think about their task performance. If findings from the TRI 
literature do indicate the amount of spontaneous monitoring people engage in, as is generally 
interpreted, the increased TRI reported by older adults may reflect increased spontaneous 
monitoring relative to younger adults. 
 
Frequency of spontaneous monitoring in everyday tasks 
 
Although mind-wandering methods can indicate how frequently people spontaneously think 
about their task performance, the vast majority of studies have been conducted within a 
laboratory setting using computerized cognitive tasks. Completing tasks in the lab can be quite 
different from completing tasks in everyday life. While everyday tasks are likely to be familiar, 
laboratory tasks typically involve novel stimuli and environments. Individuals may monitor their 
performance more often in laboratory settings compared to everyday tasks because of this 
unfamiliarity or because they are being observed and assessed. In familiar everyday tasks, 
participants may be less concerned with how accurately they perform because the consequences 
of failures may be less public and less consequential. 
 
As noted, stereotype threat may make older adults in a laboratory setting particularly likely to 
worry about their task performance and think about experimenter perceptions. This could 
increase thoughts regarding task appraisal or task difficulty and deficits in task performance. 
Indeed, evidence across numerous cognitive domains demonstrates that older adults perform 
more comparably to younger adults in everyday cognitive tasks or with more naturalistic 
materials (Kempe, Kalincinski, & Memmert, 2015; Park, Hertzog, Leventhal, Morrell, Levental, 
Birchmore, Martin, & Bennett, 1999; Rendell & Thomson, 1999; Verhaeghen, Martin & 
Sedek, 2012). Given the relationship between task performance and performance monitoring, it 
is possible that older adults’ underperformance on laboratory tasks relative to everyday tasks 
reflects underlying differences in the frequency of older adults’ monitoring across these different 
environments. 
 
Experience sampling studies of mind-wandering indicate that younger adults engage in as much 
off-task thinking about things unrelated to the task (TUTs) during everyday life as they do in 
laboratory settings (Kane et al., 2007). The results from the only published study of everyday 
mind-wandering in older adults (Gardner & Ascoli, 2015) indicate that older adults may engage 
in more TUTs during everyday life tasks than they do during laboratory tasks. However, this 
study did not include questions regarding TRI. 
 
Given that individuals, particularly older adults, often perform tasks differently in everyday life 
compared to in the lab, an important direction for future research on the topic of spontaneous 
metacognition will be to examine spontaneous thoughts regarding task appraisal in everyday life, 
perhaps by using experience sampling methods that include thought content probes containing 
task-related interference as a response option. 
 
The relationship between spontaneous monitoring and task performance 
 
As mentioned, associations exist between one’s metacognitive monitoring accuracy and one’s 
performance on criterion tasks. Although older adults underperform relative to younger adults on 
many tasks despite spared monitoring (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989; Hertzog 
& Hultsch, 2000; Hertzog, Kiddler, Powell-Momon, & Dunlosky, 2002; Hertzog, Sinclair, & 
Dunlosky, 2010; Hertzog & Dunlosky, 2011, Butterfield, Nelson, & Peck, 1988; Rabinowitz, 
Ackerman, Craik, & Hinchley, 1982), individuals with more accurate thoughts regarding their 
task performance generally tend to have better task performance than those with less accurate 
thoughts regarding their task performance. Additionally, individuals who choose more efficient 
encoding and study strategies also tend to monitor more accurately than those who do not chose 
effective strategies (Hertzog et al., 2010). 
 
Although the quality of individuals’ thoughts about their performance seems to matter for both 
task performance and task strategy choice, it is also possible that the quantity or frequency of 
these thoughts could influence performance and strategy choice. Although this relationship has 
received little focus, there is work suggesting that monitoring frequency influences task strategy 
and subsequent task performance. Several notable examples of this work were described earlier, 
including work on children’s reading behaviors and success (Owings et al., 1980), experts’ 
processing of math problems (Schoenfeld, 1985, 1987), students’ learning from history and 
science texts (Deekens, Greene, & Lobczowski, 2017), and the benefits of spontaneous self-
testing on older adults’ memory performance (Bailey, Dunlosky, & Hertzog, 2010; Bottiroli et 
al., 2010; Murphy et al., 1987). 
 
Table 1. Potential task-related predictors of spontaneous monitoring 
Task-related 
predictor 




YAs and OAs use these cues 
similarly. More fluent items are 
judged to be more likely to be 
remembered. 
Simmons & Nelson, 2006; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1974; Hertzog, 
Dunlosky, Robinson, & 
Kidder, 2003; Begg, Duft, Lalonde, 
Melnick, & Sanvito, 1989; Castel, 
McCabe, & Roediger, 2007; Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2006; Reder, 1987 
Fluency can be manipulated within 
lists of items and effects on 
monitoring frequency examined. 
Increasing perceptual fluency may 
decrease spontaneous monitoring 
Cues regarding 
item difficulty 
YAs and OAs use these cues 
similarly. Difficult test items are 
judged as less likely to be 
remembered 
Undorf & Erdfelder, 2013 Item difficulty can be manipulated 
within lists of items and effects on 
monitoring frequency examined. 
Increasing item difficulty may 
increase spontaneous monitoring 
Item 
familiarity 
YAs and OAs use this cue 
similarly. Increasing familiarity 
can result in participants 
becoming overconfident in their 
JOLs 
Shanks & Serra, 2014 Familiarity can be manipulated within 
lists and effects on monitoring 
frequency examined. Increasing item 





YAs and OAs use this cue 
similarly. Decreasing 
concreteness and relatedness 
results in items being judged as 
less likely to be remembered 
Rabinowitz, Ackerman, Craik, & 
Hinchley, 1982 
Concreteness and relatedness can be 
manipulated within lists and effects on 
monitoring frequency examined. 
Increasing concreteness and 





YAs and OAs use this cue 
similarly. Trial 1 memory for 
past performance is associated 
with Trial 2 JOLs 
Ariel & Dunlosky, 2011; Hertzog, 
Hines, & Touron, 2013; Serra & 
Ariel, 2014 
YAs and OAs are expected to 
spontaneously think about past 
performance for that item when 
presented with that item again 
Overall task 
difficulty 
Cognitive tasks with higher 
cognitive load result in more 
reported TRI 
McVay et al., 2013; Zavagnin et 
al., 2014 
Laboratory tasks that have higher 
cognitive demands should increase 
spontaneous monitoring 
YA younger adults, OA older adults, JOL judgments of learning 
 
 
Situational predictors and individual influences of spontaneous monitoring 
 
In this review, we have touched upon different task-related or situational factors that influence 
metacognitive monitoring accuracy. Individuals attend to and process different types of task-
related cues when making predictions about task performance. Manipulating the accessibility of 
different cues alters monitoring accuracy, but it is unknown whether manipulating the 
accessibility of different cues will alter how frequently individuals think about their task 
performance. Examples of common metacognitive cues, along with potential approaches to 
examine the effect of these cues on monitoring frequency, are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 2. Potential individual-level influences on spontaneous monitoring 
Individual-level Effect on monitoring accuracy Relevant citations Potential effect on monitoring 
frequency 
Age OAs report more TRI McVay et al., 2013; 
Zavagnin et al., 2014; Frank 
et al., 2015; Jordano & 
Touron, 2017 
At least for more challenging tasks, 
OAs should have increased spontaneous 






YAs higher extraversion, openness, 
and conscientiousness are 
overconfident in their predictions. 
OAs higher in agreeableness and 
conscientiousness have more 
accurate judgments 
Pallier et al., 2002; Schaefer 
et al., 2004; Dahl et 
al., 2010; Schaefer et 
al., 2004; Stankov & 
Kleitman, 2008; Burratti, 
Allwood, & 
Kleitman, 2013; Hülur, 
Hertzog, Pearman, & 
Gerstorf, 2015 
Measuring correlations between scores 
on personality assessments and 
monitoring frequency may be an area of 
future study. YAs higher extraversion, 
openness, and conscientiousness may 
report less spontaneous monitoring. 
OAs higher in agreeableness and 
conscientiousness may report more 
spontaneous monitoring 
Motivation Higher task-related motivation 
results in fewer TUTs. Effect of 
motivation plays on TRI is less clear 
Unsworth & 
McMillan, 2013; Frank et 
al. 2015 
High motivation participants may 




Higher dispositional mindfulness 
may be associated with fewer TUTs 
and more TRI 
Fountain-Zaragoza et 
al., 2016; Frank et al., 2015 
Participants higher in dispositional 




Low self-efficacy is associated with 
disconnect between subjective and 
objective memory performance in 
OAs. Low control beliefs are 
associated with less TRI in YAs and 
OAs 
Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989; 
Hultsch, Hertzog, & 
Dixon, 1987; Hertzog et 
al., 1990 
Individuals high in self-efficacy and 
control beliefs should engage in more 
spontaneous monitoring. 
Mood and affect Higher negative mood associated 
with more TUTs and TRI. 
Individuals with higher negative 
affect should spontaneously monitor 
their performance more 
Smallwood et al., 2009 Priming of negative mood should result 
in increased spontaneous monitoring 
TRI task-related interference, TUT , YA younger adults, OA older adults 
 
In addition to reviewing the effects of metacognitive cues on monitoring accuracy, we have also 
briefly discussed different individual-level or dispositional characteristics that influence 
monitoring accuracy. Such characteristics include personality type, executive control 
capabilities, task self-efficacy, and other beliefs about the self and the cognitive task being 
performed. Again, these characteristics often correlate with monitoring accuracy and differences 
in these factors across participants contribute to individual differences in monitoring accuracy. 
Although individual-level influences of monitoring accuracy have received some investigation, it 
is unknown how these characteristics influence monitoring frequency or one’s propensity to 
think about their task performance. Individual-level and dispositional influences on monitoring 
accuracy, along with potential approaches to examine the effect of these factors on monitoring 




It is important that we understand how frequently and under what circumstances people engage 
in metacognitive monitoring, but research that provides insight into these questions is relatively 
sparse and disconnected. Most studies of metacognitive monitoring focus on monitoring 
accuracy and factors that influence monitoring accuracy. Common models and theories of 
metacognition assume that individuals naturally and spontaneously engage in thinking about 
their task performance when they complete various cognitive tasks, but this assumption has not 
been well-tested and it is unclear how frequently people engage in thoughts regarding their task 
performance on both laboratory and everyday cognitive tasks. 
 
Monitoring accuracy is influenced by many aspects of cognitive tasks along with characteristics 
of the individual completing the cognitive task. Individuals attend to various cues when they 
think about their task performance. Work examining metacognitive cues assumes that individuals 
spontaneously attend to various cues but, again, work examining cue-utilization during 
performance monitoring does so by manipulating cues and examining the effects this has on the 
accuracy of individuals’ explicit metacognitive judgments. Examining how the accessibility of 
these cues affects the frequency of spontaneous monitoring can provide us with additional 
information regarding how participants naturally attend to various metacognitive cues. 
Additionally, individual differences in cognitive capacity, personality, and beliefs about 
cognition appear to influence monitoring accuracy. We know that monitoring judgments are 
more accurate for some individuals, but it is unclear whether these same factors also influence 
(or reflect) the quantity or frequency of individuals’ monitoring. 
 
Examining the frequency of spontaneous monitoring can provide critical answers to questions 
regarding the relationships between performance monitoring, task performance, and 
metacognitive control. Metacognitive accuracy is linked to better task performance and, if 
individuals who more frequently engage in monitoring tend to have better monitoring accuracy, 
then one way to increase task performance in younger and older adults may be to encourage or 
train individuals to more frequently check in on their task performance. 
 
Focused studies examining spontaneous monitoring may also provide clues as to why older 
adults show spared monitoring accuracy, despite age-related declines in processing speed and 
working memory performance. One reason for older adults’ spared monitoring may be that they 
engage in more spontaneous monitoring and thus have more expertise with metacognitive 
monitoring. This review describes specific directions for future research that will help to address 
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